By taking
them in their first intention, I mean ignoring
their relation to possible perceptual experiences
with which they may be connected,
which they may lead to and terminate in, and
which then they may be supposed to 'represent.'
16
Taking them in this way first, we confine
the problem to a world merely 'thought-
of' and not directly felt or seen. This world,
just like the world of percepts, comes to us at
first as a chaos of experiences, but lines of order
soon get traced. We find that any bit of it
which we may cut out as an example is connected
with distinct groups of associates, just
as our perceptual experiences are, that these
associates link themselves with it by different
relations,(2) and that one forms the inner history
of a person, while the other acts as an impersonal
'objective' world, either spatial and temporal,
or else merely logical or mathematical,
or otherwise 'ideal.'
The first obstacle on the part of the reader to
seeing that these non-perceptual experiences
---
2 Here as elsewhere the relations are of course _experienced_
relations, members of the same originally chaotic manifold of non-
perceptual experience of which the related terms themselves are
parts.
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