IV
Were I now to go on to treat of the knowing
of perceptual by conceptual experiences, it
would again prove to be an affair of external
relations. One experience would be the knower,
the other the reality known; and I could
perfectly well define, without the notion of
'consciousness,' what the knowing actually
and practically amounts to -- leading-towards,
namely, and terminating-in percepts, through
a series of transitional experiences which the
world supplies. But I will not treat of this,
space being insufficient.(1) I will rather consider
---
1 I have given a partial account of the matter in _Mind_, vol. X, p.
27, 1885, and in the _Psychological_Review_, vol. II, p. 105, 1895. See
also C.A. Strong's article in the
_Journal_of_Philosophy,_Psychology_and_Scientific_Methods_, vol I, p.
253, May 12, 1904. I hope myself very soon to recur to the matter.
---
26
a few objections that are sure to be urged
against the entire theory as it stands.
V
First of all, this will be asked: "If experience
has not 'conscious' existence, if it be not
partly made of 'consciousness,' of what then
is it made? Matter we know, and thought we
know, and conscious content we know, but
neutral and simple 'pure experience' is something
we know not at all.
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