As thing, the experience is extended; as
thought, it occupies no space or place. As
thing, it is red, hard, heavy; but who ever heard
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of a red, hard or heavy thought? Yet even
now you said that an experience is made of
just what appears, and what appears is just
such adjectives. How can the one experience
in its thing-function be made of them, consist
of them, carry them as its own attributes, while
in its thought-function it disowns them and
attributes them elsewhere. There is a self-contradiction
here from which the radical dualism
of thought and thing is the only truth that can
save us. Only if the thought is one kind of
being can the adjectives exist in it 'intentionally'
(to use the scholastic term); only if the
thing is another kind, can they exist in it constituitively
and energetically. No simple subject
can take the same adjectives and at one
time be qualified by it, and at another time be
merely 'of' it, as of something only meant or
known."
The solution insisted on by this objector, like
many other common-sense solutions, grows
the less satisfactory the more one turns it in
one's mind. To begin with, _are_ thought and
thing as heterogeneous as is commonly said?
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No one denies that they have some categories
in common.
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