(1)
Descartes for the first time defined thought
as the absolutely unextended, and later philosophers
have accepted the description as correct.
But what possible meaning has it to say
that, when we think of a foot-rule or a square
yard, extension is not attributable to our
thought? Of every extended object the _adequate_
mental picture must have all the extension
of the object itself. The difference between
objective and subjective extension is
one of relation to a context solely. In the mind
the various extents maintain no necessarily
stubborn order relatively to each other, while
---
1 Spencer's proof of his 'Transfigured Realism' (his doctrine that
there is an absolutely non-mental reality) comes to mind as a splendid
instance of the impossibility of establishing radical heterogeneity
between thought and thing. All his painfully accumulated points of
difference run gradually into their opposites, and are full of
exceptions.
---
31
in the physical world they bound each other
stably, and, added together, make the great
enveloping Unit which we believe in and call
real Space. As 'outer,' they carry themselves
adversely, so to speak, to one another, exclude
one another and maintain their distances;
while, as 'inner,' their order is loose, and they
form a _durcheinander_ in which unity is lost.
Pages:
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40