(1)
But to argue from this that inner experience is
absolutely inextensive seems to me little short
of absurd. The two worlds differ, not by the
presence or absence of extension, but by the
relations of the extensions which in both
worlds exist.
Does not this case of extension now put us
on the track of truth in the case of other qualities?
It does; and I am surprised that the facts
should not have been noticed long ago. Why,
for example, do we call a fire hot, and water
wet, and yet refuse to say that our mental
state, when it is 'of' these objects, is either wet
or hot? 'Intentionally,' at any rate, and when
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the mental state is a vivid image, hotness and
wetness are in it just as much as they are in the
physical experience. The reason is this, that,
as the general chaos of all our experiences gets
sifted, we find that there are some fires that
will always burn sticks and always warm our
bodies, and that there are some waters that
will always put out fires; while there are other
fires and waters that will not act at all. The
general group of experiences that _act_, that do
not only possess their natures intrinsically, but
wear them adjectively and energetically, turning
them against one another, comes inevitably
to be contrasted with the group whose members,
having identically the same natures, fail
to manifest them in the 'energetic' way.
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