To discuss all the ways in which one experience
may function as the knower of another,
would be incompatible with the limits
of this essay.91) I have just treated of type 1, the
---
1 For brevity's sake I altogether omit mention of the type
constituted by knowledge of the truth of general propositions. This
type has been thoroughly and, so far as I can see, satisfactorily,
elucidated in Dewey's _Studies_in_Logical_Theory_. Such propositions
are reducible to the S-is-P form; and the 'terminus' that verifies and
fulfils is the SP in combination. Of course percepts may be involved in
the mediating experiences, or in the 'satisfactoriness' of the P in its
new position.
---
54
kind of knowledge called perception. This is
the type of case in which the mind enjoys direct
'acquaintance' with a present object. In
the other types the mind has 'knowledge-
about' an object not immediately there. Of
type 2, the simplest sort of conceptual knowledge,
I have given some account in two
articles.(1) Type 3 can always formally
and hypothetically be reduced to type 2, so
that a brief description of that type will put
the present reader sufficiently at my point
of view, and make him see what the actual
meanings of the mysterious cognitive relation
may be.
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