In my own mind
such a philosophy harmonizes best with a radical
pluralism, with novelty and indeterminism,
moralism and theism, and with the 'humanism'
lately sprung upon us by the Oxford and
the Chicago schools.(1) I can not, however, be
sure that all these doctrines are its necessary
and indispensable allies. It presents so many
points of difference, both from the common
sense and from the idealism that have made
our philosophic language, that it is almost
---
1 I have said something of this latter alliance in an article entitled
'Humanism and Truth,' in Mind, October, 1904. [Reprinted in
_The_Meaning_of_Truth_, pp. 51-101. Cf. also "humanism and Truth Once
More," below, pp. 244-265.]
---
difficult to state it as it is to think it out
clearly, and if it is ever to grow into a respectable
system, it will have to be built up by the
contributions of many co-operating minds. It
seems to me, as I said at the outset of this essay,
that many minds are, in point of fact, now
turning in a direction that points towards radical
empiricism. If they are carried farther by
my words, and if then they add their stronger
voices to my feebler one, the publication of
this essay will have been worth while.
Pages:
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89