I, [1904], pp. 403 ff., especially pp.
405-407.
101
in a general way the common-sense belief that
one and the same world is cognized by our
different minds; but I left undiscussed the
dialectical arguments which maintain that
this is logically absurd. The usual reason
given for its being absurd is that it assumes
one object (to wit, the world) to stand in two
relations at once; to my mind, namely, and
again to yours; whereas a term taken in a
second relation can not logically be the same
term which it was at first.
I have heard this reason urged so often in
discussing with absolutists, and it would destroy
my radical empiricism so utterly, if it
were valid, that I am bound to give it an attentive
ear, and seriously to search its strength.
For instance, let the matter in dispute be
term M, asserted to be on the one hand related
to L, and on the other to N; and let the two
cases of relation be symbolized by L-M and
M-N respectively. When, now, I assume
that the experience may immediately come
and be given in the shape L-M-N, with
no trace of doubling or internal fission in the
102
M, I am told that this is all a popular delusion;
that L-M-N logically means two different
experiences, L-M and M-N, namely;
and that although the Absolute may, and indeed
must, from its superior point of view,
read its own kind of unity into M's two editions,
yet as elements in finite experience the
two M's lie irretrievably asunder, and the
world between them is broken and unbridged.
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