'(1) Undoubtedly,
since we use two phrases in talking first about
'M's relation to L' and then about 'M's relation
to N,' we must be having, or must have
had, two distinct perceptions; -- and the rest
would then seem to follow duly. But the starting-
point of the reasoning here seems to be the
fact of the two _phrases_; and this suggests that
---
1 [Hume: _Treatise_of_Human_Nature_, Appendix, Selby-Bigge's
edition, p. 636.]
104
the argument may be merely verbal. Can it be
that the whole dialectic consists in attributing
to the experience talked-about a constitution
similar to that of the language in which we describe
it? Must we assert the objective doubleness
of the M merely because we have to name
it twice over when we name its two relations?
Candidly, I can think of no other reason
than this for the dialectic conclusion;(1) for, if
we think, not of our words, but of any simple
concrete matter which they may be held to
signify, the experience itself belies the paradox
asserted. We use indeed two separate concepts
in analyzing our object, but we know them all
the while to be but substitutional, and that the
M in L-M and the M in M-N _mean_ (i.e.
Pages:
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100