It may well be that we _attribute_ a certain
relation falsely, because the circumstances of the case, being complex,
have deceived us. At a railway station we may take our own train,
and not the one that fills our window, to be moving. We here put
motion in the wrong place in the world, but in its original place the
motion is a part of reality. What Mr. Bradley means is nothing like
this, but rather that such things as motion are nowhere real, and
that, even in their aboriginal and empirically incorrigible seats,
relations are impossible of comprehension.
109
must be to rescue radical empiricism from Mr.
Bradley. Fortunately, as it seems to me, his
general contention, that the very notion of relation
is unthinkable clearly, has been successfully
met by many critics.(1)
It is a burden to the flesh, and an injustice
both to readers and to the previous writers, to
repeat good arguments already printed. So, in
noticing Mr. Bradley, I will confine myself to
the interests of radical empiricism solely.
V
The first duty of radical empiricism, taking
given conjunctions at their face-value, is to
class some of them as more intimate and some
as more external.
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