Of
course, if the table be wet, it will moisten the book, or if it be
slight enough and the book be heavy enough, the book will break it down.
But such collateral phenomena are not the point at issue. The point is
whether the successive relations 'on' and 'not-on' can rationally (not
physically) hold of the same constant terms, abstractly taken.
Professor A.E. Taylor drops from logical into material considerations
when he instances color-contrast as a proof that A, 'as contra-
distinguished from B, is not the same thing as mere A not in any way
affected' (_Elements_of_Metaphysics_, p. 145). Note the substitution,
for 'related' of the word 'affected,' which begs the whole question.
112
the other side there are as obvious difficulties
does not occur to common sense at all. And I
will begin by pointing out these difficulties. . . .
There is a relation in the result, and this relation,
we hear, is to make no difference in its
terms. But, if so, to what does it make a difference?
[_Does_n't_it_make_a_difference_to_us_on-_
_lookers,_at_least?_] and what is the meaning and
sense of qualifying the terms by it? [_Surely_the_
_meaning_is_to_tell_the_truth_about_their_relative_
_position_.
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