579, of the possibility that an abstract quality A, B, or C,
in a thing, 'may throughout remain unchanged' although the thing be
altered; or his admission that red-hairedness, both as analyzed out
of a man and when given with the rest of him, there may be 'no
change' p. 580). Why does he immediately add that for the pluralist
to plead the non-mutation of such abstractions would be an _ignoratio_
_elenchi?_ It is impossible to admit it to be such. The entire
_elenchus_ and inquest is just as to whether parts which you can
abstract from their inner nature. If they can thus mould various wholes
into new _gestalqualitaten_, then it follows that the same elements are
logically able to exist in different wholes [whether physically able
would depend on additional hypotheses]; that partial changes are
thinkable, and through-and-through change not a dialectic necessity;
that monism is only an hypothesis; and that an additively constituted
universe is a rationally respectable hypothesis also. All theses of
radical empiricism, in short, follow.
116
full Bradleyan answer. The 'whole' which he
here treats as primary and determinative of
each part's manner of 'contributing,' simply
_must_, when it alters, alter in its entirety.
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