I admitted that I had not space
to treat of certain possible objections in that
article; but in [the last essay] I took some of
the objections up. At the end of that [essay]
I said that a still more formidable-sounding
---
1 "A World of Pure Experience," above, pp. 39-91.
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objections remained; so, to leave my pure-
experience theory in as strong a state as possible,
I propose to consider those objections now.
I
The objections I previously tried to dispose
of were purely logical or dialectical. no one
identical term, whether physical or psychical,
it had been said, could be the subject of two
relations at once. This thesis I sought to prove
unfounded. The objections that now confront
us arise from the nature supposed to inhere in
psychic facts specifically. Whatever may be
the case with physical objects, a fact of consciousness,
it is alleged (and indeed very plausibly),
can not, without self-contradiction, be
treated as a portion of two different minds,
and for the following reasons.
In the physical world we make with impunity
the assumption that one and the same
material object can figure in an indefinitely
large number of different processes at once.
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