I will say nothing here of the persistent
ambiguity of _relations_. They are undeniable
parts of pure experience; yet, while common
sense and what I call radical empiricism stand
---
1 [Cf. A.E. Taylor: _Elements_of_Metaphysics_, bk. III, ch. IV.]
2 [Cf. K. Pearson: _Grammar_of_Science_, ch. III.]
149
for their being objective, both rationalism and
the usual empiricism claim that they are exclusively
the 'work of the mind' -- the finite
mind or the absolute mind, as the case may be.
Turn now to those affective phenomena
which more directly concern us.
We soon learn to separate the ways in which
things appeal to our interests and emotions
from the ways in which they act upon one
another. It does not _work_ to assume that physical
objects are going to act outwardly by
their sympathetic or antipathetic qualities.
The beauty of a thing or its value is no force
that can be plotted in a polygon of compositions,
nor does its 'use' or 'significance' affect in
the minutest degree its vicissitudes or destiny
at the hands of physical nature. Chemical
'affinities' are a purely verbal metaphor; and,
as I just said, even such things as forces, tensions,
and activities can at a pinch be regarded
as anthropomorphic projections.
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