"(1) Munsterberg excludes a
view opposed to his own by saying that with
any one who holds it a _Verstandigung_ with
him is "_grundsatzlich_ausgeschlosen_"; and
Royce, in a review of _Stoud_,(2) hauls him over
the coals at great length for defending 'efficacy'
in a way which I, for one, never gathered
from reading him, and which I have
heard Stout himself say was quite foreign to
the intention of his text.
In these discussion distinct questions are
habitually jumbled and different points of
view are talked of _durcheinander_.
(1) There is a psychological question: "Have
we perceptions of activity? and if so, what are
they like, and when and where do we have
them?"
(2) There is a metaphysical question: "Is
there a _fact_ of activity? and if so, what idea
must we frame of it? What is it like? and what
---
1 [_Mind_, vol. XII, 1887, pp. 573-574.]
2 _Mind_, N.S., vol. VI, [1897], p. 379.
159
does it do, if it does anything?" And finally
there is a logical question:
(3) "Whence do we _know_ activity? By our
own feelings of it solely? or by some other
source of information?" Throughout page
after page of the literature one knows not
which of these questions is before one; and
mere description of the surface-show of experience
is proffered as if it implicitly answered
every one of them.
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