Stout, as I
apprehend him, identifies 'our' activity with that of the total
experience-process, and when I circumscribe it as a part thereof,
accuses me of treating it as a sort of external appendage to itself
(Stout: op.cit., vol. I, pp. 162-163), as if I 'separated the activity
from the process which is active.' But all the processes in question
are active, and their activity is inseparable from their being. My book
raised only the question of _which_ activity deserved the name of
'ours.' So far as we are 'persons,' and contrasted and opposed to an
'environment,' movements in our body figure as our activities; and I am
unable to find any other activities that are ours in this strictly
personal sense. There is a wider sense in which the whole 'choir of
heaven and furniture of the earth,' and their activities, are ours, for
they are our 'objects.' But 'we' are here only another name for the
total process of experience, another name for all that is, in fact; and
I was dealing with the personal and individualized self exclusively in
the passages with which Professor Stout finds fault.
The individualized self, which I believe to be the only thing
properly called self, is a part of the content of the world experienced.
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