No
philosophic knowledge of the general nature
and constitution of tendencies, or of the relation
of larger to smaller ones, can help us to
predict which of all the various competing
tendencies that interest us in this universe are
likeliest to prevail. We know as an empirical
fact that far-seeing tendencies often carry out
their purpose, but we know also that they are
often defeated by the failure of some contemptibly
small process on which success depends.
A little thrombus in a statesman's
meningeal artery will throw an empire out of
gear. I can therefore not even hint at any solution
of the pragmatic issue. I have only wished
to show you that that issue is what gives the
real interest to all inquiries into what kinds of
activity may be real. Are the forces that really
act in the world more foreseeing or more blind?
As between 'our' activities as 'we' experience
them, and those of our ideas, or of our brain-
cells, the issue is well-defined.
181
I said a while back(1) that I should return to
the 'metaphysical' question before ending; so,
with a few words about that, I will now close
my remarks.
In whatever form we hear this question propounded,
I think that it always arises from two
things, a belief that _causality_ must be exerted
in activity, and a wonder as to how causality is
made.
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