(2)
---
1 In _Science_, November 4, 1904, p. 599.
2 This statement is probably excessively obscure to any who
has not read my two articles, 'Does Consciousness Exist?' and 'A World
of Pure Experience.'
197
This second case is that of sense-perception.
There is a stage of thought that goes beyond
common sense, and of it I shall say more presently;
but the common-sense stage is a perfectly
definite halting-place of thought, primarily
for the purposes of action; and, so long
as we remain on the common-sense stage of
thought, object and subject _fuse_ in the fact of
'presentation' or sense-perception -- the pen
and hand which I now _see_ writing, for example,
_are_ the physical realities which those words
designate. In this case there is no self-transcendency
implied in the knowing. Humanism,
here, is only a more comminuted _Identitasphilosophie_.(1)
In case (1), on the contrary, the representative
experience does transcend itself in knowing
the other experience that is its object. No
one can talk of the knowledge of the one by the
other without seeing them as numerically distinct
entities, of which the one lies beyond the
other and away from it, along some direction
---
1 [Cf.
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