above, pp. 134, 197.]
203
sensation. The sensation, which for common
sense is not so much 'true' as 'real,' is held to
be _provisionally_ true by the philosopher just
in so far as it _covers_ (abuts at, or occupies the
place of) a still more absolutely real experience,
in the possibility of which to come remoter
experient the philosopher finds reason
to believe.
Meanwhile what actually _does_ count for true
to any individual trower, whether he be philosopher
or common man, is always a result of his
_apperceptions_. If a novel experience, conceptual
or sensible, contradict too emphatically our
pre-existent system of beliefs, in ninety-nine
cases out of a hundred it is treated as false.
Only when the older and the newer experiences
are congruous enough to mutually apperceive
and modify each other, does what we treat as
an advance in truth result. [Having written of
this point in an article in reply to Mr. Joseph's
criticism of my humanism, I will say no more
about truth here, but refer the reader to that
review.(1)] In no case, however, need truth
---
1 [Omitted from reprint in _Meaning_of_Truth_. The review referred
to is reprinted below, pp. 244-265, under the title "Humanism and Truth
Once More.
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