Newton's theory of ultimate atoms;
Leibnitz's doctrine of monads; and the dynamic theory of Boscovich,
which makes matter mere centres of force, are all dismissed as
unthinkable. It is not very clear in what sense that word is to be
taken. Sometimes it seems to mean, meaningless; at others,
self-contradictory or absurd; at others, inconceivable, _i. e._ that of
which no conception or mental image can be formed; at any rate, it
implies what is unknowable and untenable. The result is, so far as
matter is concerned, that we know nothing about it. "Our conception of
matter," he says, "reduced to its simplest shape, is that of coexistent
positions that offer resistance, as contrasted with our conception of
space in which the coexistent positions offer no resistance." (p. 166).
Resistance, however, is a form of force; and, therefore, on the
following page, Spencer says, "that forces standing in certain
correlations, form the whole contents of our idea of matter."
When we turn from the objective to the subjective, from the external to
the inward world, the result is still the same. He agrees with Hume in
saying that the contents of our consciousness is a series of impressions
and ideas. He dissents, however, from that philosopher, in saying that
that series is all we know. He admits that impressions necessarily imply
that there is something that is impressed.
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