Bateman on
`Aphasia,' 1870, p. 110.
In the course of the foregoing remarks and throughout this volume,
I have often felt much difficulty about the proper application of
the terms, will, consciousness, and intention. Actions, which were
at first voluntary, soon became habitual, and at last hereditary,
and may then be performed even in opposition to the will.
Although they often reveal the state of the mind, this result was
not at first either intended or expected. Even such words as that
"certain movements serve as a means of expression" are apt to mislead,
as they imply that this was their primary purpose or object.
This, however, seems rarely or never to have been the case;
the movements having been at first either of some direct use,
or the indirect effect of the excited state of the sensorium.
An infant may scream either intentionally or instinctively to show
that it wants food; but it has no wish or intention to draw its
features into the peculiar form which so plainly indicates misery;
yet some of the most characteristic expressions exhibited by man
are derived from the act of screaming, as has been explained.
Although most of our expressive actions are innate or instinctive,
as is admitted by everyone, it is a different question whether we
have any instinctive power of recognizing them.
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