In other words,
we foretold in this declaration those results which later came to be
known collectively under the name of "Kornilovism." We believed that the
greatest danger threatened the revolution in either case--whether the
drive proved successful, which we did not expect, or met with failure,
which seemed to us almost inevitable. A successful military advance
would have united the middle class and the bourgeoisie in their common
chauvinistic tendencies, thus isolating the revolutionary proletariat.
An unsuccessful drive was likely to demoralize the army completely, to
involve a general retreat and the loss of much additional territory, and
to bring disgust and disappointment to the people. Events took the
latter course. The news of victory did not last long. It was soon
replaced by gloomy reports of the refusal of many regiments to support
the advancing columns, of the great losses in commanding officers, who
sometimes composed the whole of the attacking units, etc. In view of its
great historical significance, we append an extract from the document
issued by our party in the All-Russian Council of Soviets on the 3rd of
June, 1917, just two weeks before the drive.
* * * * *
"We deem it necessary to present, as the first order of the day, a
question on whose solution depend not only all the other measures to be
adopted by the Council, but actually and literally the fate of the whole
Russian revolution the question of the military drive which is being
planned for the immediate future.
Pages:
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26