The secret of attaining such a
victory was not in our possession. And inasmuch as we would not
undertake the obligation to change the balance of the world powers at a
moment's notice, we frankly and openly declared that revolutionary power
may under certain conditions be compelled to agree to an annexationist
peace. A revolutionary power would fall short of its high principles
only in the event that it should attempt to conceal from its own people
the predatory character of the peace, but by no means, however, in the
event that the course of the struggle should compel it to adopt such a
peace.
At the same time, we indicated that we were leaving to continue
negotiations under conditions which were seemingly improving for us and
becoming worse for our enemies. We observed the movement in
Austria-Hungary, and there were signs indicating (this was made the
basis for statements by representatives of the German Social Democracy
in the Reichstag) that Germany was on the eve of similar events. We went
with this hope. During the first days of this visit to Brest-Litovsk the
wireless brought us from Vilna the first news that in Berlin an enormous
strike movement was developing; this movement as well as that of
Austria-Hungary was directly connected with the course of negotiations
in Brest. However, as is often the case, by reason of the dialectic of
the class struggle, just this conspicuous beginning of the proletarian
rising, which surpassed anything Germany had ever seen, was bound to
push the property classes to a closer consolidation and to greater
hostility against the proletariat.
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