He had in the first place no prepossession
in favor of the United States. We believe that he was not at all
unwilling to see the Union dissolved. It was natural for a statesman
hardened by fifty years of intrigue and devotion to politics to look
with absolute gratification upon what seemed the dissolution of a great,
and, because a near, a hated rival. We do not think it too much to
assume, that, as far as Palmerston's personal feelings were concerned,
he was ready for the chance of Southern recognition at the outset. In
such a sentiment, he had the sympathy of the aristocracy, and of all
others who take the low standard of self-aggrandizement in determining
opinions. Two circumstances, however, were a restraint upon him, and
appealed with controlling force to his caution. He was not only an
aristocrat and a hater of republics, he was also the Prime-Minister of
_all_ England. He was absolutely dependent to a great degree upon the
lower orders for the permanence of his present dignity. Was it wise in
him to disregard the sentiments of those who were advancing to the
predominance, and resort for support to those whose power was rapidly
waning, whose opinions were yielding to the newer intelligence? Would it
not be fatally inconsistent in a Liberal statesman to override every
Liberal maxim and belie every Liberal profession? Was not the popular
current too strong to be safely defied? There were Liberal statesmen
enough of conspicuous merit to take his place at the helm, should he
make the misstep: Gladstone, Gibson, Herbert, Granville, would fully
answer the popular demand: his downfall, if it came, would doubtless be
final.
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