But if we require more, and ask for a definition which will
stand the test of philosophical examination, we must reply that such
only can be given as is dependent upon the satisfaction of the inquirer.
Progressive minds will find it difficult to circumscribe the meaning of
words, especially on matters with which they are well acquainted.
Brown, in his "Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind," observes
that the ludicrous is a compound feeling of gladness and astonishment;
not a very comprehensive view, for according to it, if a man were
informed that he had been left a sum of money, he would regard his good
fortune as highly absurd.
Beattie maintains, on the contrary, that the ludicrous is a simple
feeling, and therefore indefinable, a statement in which the premise
seems more correct than the conclusion. The opinion that it is simple
and primary, although not admitting of proof, has some probability in
its favour. It arose from a conviction that we had no means of reaching
it, of taking it to pieces, and was derived from the unsatisfactory
character of such attempts as that of Brown, or from analogy with some
other emotions, or with physical substances whose essence we cannot
ascertain. If we can connect the ludicrous with certain acts of
judgment, we cannot tell how far the emotion is modified by them, and
even if we seem to have detected some elements in it, we were not
conscious of them at the moment of our being amused.
Pages:
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320