"A fault in manner," he says, "is laughable; a false
pretension is ridiculous, a situation which exposes vice to detestation
is comic, a _bon mot_ is pleasant."
Dugald Stewart proceeds so far as almost to exclude vice, for he only
specifies "slight imperfections in the character and manners, such as do
not excite any moral indignation." He says that it is especially excited
by affectation, hypocrisy, and vanity.
We trace in these successive opinions of philosophers an improvement in
humour, proportionate to the progress of mankind. As men of literature,
they drew general conclusions, and from the higher and more cultivated
classes, probably much from books. Had they taken a wider range, their
catalogues would have been more comprehensive.
But the amelioration we have traced is as much in the general tone of
feeling as in humour itself, if not more. Bitter reflections upon the
personal or moral defects of others are not so acceptable now as
formerly; the "glorying" over the downfall of our neighbours is less
common.
Thus we mark an improvement in the sentiments which accompany the
ludicrous, and which many philosophers seem to have mistaken for the
ludicrous itself. Neither hostility, indelicacy, nor profanity can
create the ludicrous, but where they do not disgust they vivify and make
it more effective.
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