' The decisive event was the naval action of
Salamis. To have made certain of success, the Persians should have
first obtained a command of the AEgean, as complete for all practical
purposes as the French and English had of the sea generally in
the war against Russia of 1854-56. The Persian sea-power was not
equal to the task. The fleet of the great king was numerically
stronger than that of the Greek allies; but it has been proved
many times that naval efficiency does not depend on numerical
superiority alone. The choice sections of the Persian fleet were
the contingents of the Ionians and Phoenicians. The former were
half-hearted or disaffected; whilst the latter were, at best, not
superior in skill, experience, and valour to the Greek sailors. At
Salamis Greece was saved not only from the ambition and vengeance
of Xerxes, but also and for many centuries from oppression by an
Oriental conqueror. Persia did not succeed against the Greeks,
not because she had no sea-power, but because her sea-power,
artificially built up, was inferior to that which was a natural
element of the vitality of her foes. Ionia was lost and Greece
in the end enslaved, because the quarrels of Greeks with Greeks
led to the ruin of their naval states.
The Peloponnesian was largely a naval war. The confidence of
the Athenians in their sea-power had a great deal to do with its
outbreak. The immediate occasion of the hostilities, which in
time involved so many states, was the opportunity offered by the
conflict between Corinth and Corcyra of increasing the sea-power of
Athens.
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