It would be an interesting and perhaps not a barren
investigation to inquire to what extent the decline of the mother
states of Phoenicia, consequent on the campaigns of Alexander
the Great, had helped to enfeeble the naval efficiency of the
Carthaginian defences. One thing was certain. Carthage had now
met with a rival endowed with natural maritime resources greater
than her own. That rival also contained citizens who understood
the true importance of sea-power. 'With a statesmanlike sagacity
from which succeeding generations might have drawn a lesson, the
leading men of the Roman Commonwealth perceived that all their
coast-fortifications and coast-garrisons would prove inadequate
unless the war-marine of the state were again placed on a footing
that should command respect.'[20] It is a gloomy reflection that
the leading men of our own great maritime country could not see
this in 1860. A thorough comprehension of the events of the first
Punic war enables us to solve what, until Mahan wrote, had been
one of the standing enigmas of history, viz. Hannibal's invasion
of Italy by land instead of by sea in the second Punic war. Mahan's
masterly examination of this question has set at rest all doubts
as to the reason of Hannibal's action.[21] The naval predominance
in the western basin of the Mediterranean acquired by Rome had
never been lost. Though modern historians, even those belonging
to a maritime country, may have failed to perceive it, the
Carthaginians knew well enough that the Romans were too strong
for them on the sea.
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