Our early continental wars, therefore, are proofs of the
long-established efficiency of our naval defences. Notwithstanding
the greater attention paid, within the last dozen years or so,
to naval affairs, it is doubtful if the country generally even
yet recognises the extent to which its security depends upon a
good fleet as fully as our ancestors did nearly seven centuries
ago. The narrative of our pre-Elizabethan campaigns is interesting
merely as a story; and, when told--as for instance D. Hannay
has told it in the introductory chapters of his 'Short History
of the Royal Navy'--it will be found instructive and worthy of
careful study at the present day. Each of the principal events
in our early naval campaigns may be taken as an illustration of
the idea conveyed by the term 'sea-power,' and of the accuracy
with which its meaning was apprehended at the time. To take a
very early case, we may cite the defeat of Eustace the Monk by
Hubert de Burgh in 1217. Reinforcements and supplies had been
collected at Calais for conveyance to the army of Prince Louis
of France and the rebel barons who had been defeated at Lincoln.
The reinforcements tried to cross the Channel under the escort of
a fleet commanded by Eustace. Hubert de Burgh, who had stoutly
held Dover for King John, and was faithful to the young Henry
III, heard of the enemy's movements. 'If these people land,'
said he, 'England is lost; let us therefore boldly meet them.
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