The Chinese land-forces were defeated. The navy of
japan, being superior on the sea, was able to keep its sister
service supplied or reinforced as required. It was, however, not
the navy, but the army, which finally frustrated the Chinese
efforts at defence, and really terminated the war. What the navy
did was what, in accordance with the limitations of sea-power,
may be expected of a navy. It made the transport of the army
across the sea possible; and enabled it to do what of itself
the army could not have done, viz. overcome the last resistance
of the enemy.
[Footnote 48: _Naval_Warfare_, 3rd ed. p. 436.]
The issue of the Spanish-American war, at least as regards the mere
defeat of Spain, was, perhaps, a foregone conclusion. That Spain,
even without a serious insurrection on her hands, was unequal to
the task of meeting so powerful an antagonist as the United States
must have been evident even to Spaniards. Be that as it may, an
early collapse of the Spanish defence was not anticipated, and
however one-sided the war may have been seen to be, it furnished
examples illustrating rules as old as naval warfare. Mahan says of
it that, 'while possessing, as every war does, characteristics of
its own differentiating it from others, nevertheless in its broad
analogies it falls into line with its predecessors, evidencing that
unity of teaching which pervades the art from its beginnings unto
this day.
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