On the contrary, history has shown that such evasions
are always possible, to some extent, to the weaker party, however
great the inequality of naval strength.'[55] The Anglo-French
command of the sea in 1854-56, complete as it was, did not enable
the allies to intercept the Russian ships in the North-Western
Pacific, nor did that held by the Federals in the American civil
war put an early stop to the cruises of the Confederate vessels.
What the term really does imply is the power possessed from the
first, or gained during hostilities, by one belligerent of carrying
out considerable over-sea expeditions at will. In the Russian
war just mentioned the allies had such overwhelmingly superior
sea-power that the Russians abandoned to them without a struggle
the command of the sea; and the more recent landing in South
Africa, more than six thousand miles away, of a large British army
without even a threat of interruption on the voyage is another
instance of unchallenged command. In wars between great powers
and also between secondary powers, if nearly equally matched,
this absence of challenge is rare. The rule is that the command
of the sea has to be won after hostilities begin. To win it the
enemy's naval force must be neutralised. It must be driven into
his ports and there blockaded or 'masked,' and thus rendered
virtually innocuous; or it must be defeated and destroyed. The
latter is the preferable, because the more effective, plan.
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