The French
had not perceived that, except for a short time and for minor
operations, you cannot separate the command of the Mediterranean
or of any particular area of water from that of the sea in general.
Local command of the sea may enable a belligerent to make a hasty
raid, seize a relatively insignificant port, or cut out a vessel;
but it will not ensure his being able to effect anything requiring
considerable time for its execution, or, in other words, anything
likely to have an important influence on the course of the war.
If Great Britain has not naval force enough to retain command
of the Mediterranean, she will certainly not have force enough
to retain command of the English Channel. It can be easily shown
why it should be so. In war danger comes less from conditions of
locality than from the enemy's power to hurt. Taking up a weak
position when confronting an enemy may help him in the exercise of
his power, but it does not constitute it.[57] A maritime enemy's
power to hurt resides in his fleet. If that can be neutralised
his power disappears. It is in the highest degree improbable
that this end can be attained by splitting up our own fleet into
fragments so as to have a part of it in nearly every quarter in
which the enemy may try to do us mischief. The most promising
plan--as experience has often proved--is to meet the enemy, when
he shows himself, with a force sufficiently strong to defeat
him.
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