As regards defence against the enemy, the
mutinies affected the security of the country very little. The
seamen always expressed their determination to do their duty if
the enemy put to sea. Even at the Nore they conspicuously displayed
their general loyalty; and, as a matter of fact, discipline had
regained its sway some time before the expedition preparing in
Holland was ready. How effectively the crews of the ships not
long before involved in the mutiny could fight, was proved at
Camperdown.
Though earlier in date than the events just discussed, the celebrated
first expedition to Ireland has been intentionally left out of
consideration till now. As to the general features of the
undertaking, and even some of its more important details, the
documents now published add little to our knowledge. The literature
of the expedition is large, and Captain Chevalier had given us an
admirable account of it in his 'Histoire de la Marine Francaise
sous la premiere Republique.' The late Vice-Admiral Colomb submitted
it to a most instructive examination in the _Journal_of_the_
_Royal_United_Service_Institution_ for January 1892. We can,
however, learn something from Captain Desbriere's collection.
The perusal suggests, or indeed compels, the conclusion that the
expedition was doomed to failure from the start. It had no money,
stores, or means of transport. There was no hope of finding these
in a country like the south-western corner of Ireland.
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