We need not impute to our neighbours a burning desire to
invade us; but it is a becoming exercise of ordinary strategic
precaution to contemplate preparations for repelling what, as a
mere military problem, they consider still feasible. No amount
of naval superiority will ever ensure every part of our coast
against incursions like that of Tate and his gaol-birds. Naval
superiority, however, will put in our hands the power of preventing
the arrival of an army strong enough to carry out a real invasion.
The strength of such an army will largely depend upon the amount of
mobile land force of which we can dispose. Consequently, defence
against invasion, even of an island, is the duty of a land army
as well as of a fleet. The more important part may, in our case,
be that of the latter; but the services of the former cannot be
dispensed with. The best method of utilising those services calls
for much thought. In 1798, when the 'First Army of England' menaced
us from the southern coast of the Channel, it was reported to our
Government that an examination of the plans formerly adopted for
frustrating intended invasions showed the advantage of troubling
the enemy in his own home and not waiting till he had come to
injure us in ours.
VII
OVER-SEA RAIDS AND RAIDS ON LAND[64]
[Footnote 64: Written in 1906. (_The_Morning_Post_.)]
It has been contended that raids by 'armaments with 1000, 20,000,
and 50,000 men on board respectively' have succeeded in evading
'our watching and chasing fleets,' and that consequently invasion
of the British Isles on a great scale is not only possible but
fairly practicable, British naval predominance notwithstanding.
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