If
the Government prepares for war and yet peace is preserved, it
is accused of unpardonable extravagance in making preparations.
Whether it makes these on a sufficient scale or not, it is accused,
if war does break out--at least in the earlier period of the
contest--of not having done enough. Political opponents and the
'man in the street' agree in charging the administration with
panic profusion in one case, and with criminal niggardliness in
the other. Elizabeth hoped to preserve peace. She had succeeded
in keeping out of an 'official' war for a long time, and she had
much justification for the belief that she could do so still
longer. 'She could not be thoroughly persuaded,' says Mr. David
Hannay,[66] 'that it was hopeless to expect to avert the Spanish
invasion by artful diplomacy.' Whilst reasonable precautions
were not neglected, she was determined that no one should be
able to say with truth that she had needlessly thrown away money
in a fright. For the general naval policy of England at the time,
Elizabeth, as both the nominal and the real head of the Government,
is properly held responsible. The event showed the perfect efficiency
of that policy.
[Footnote 66: _A_Short_History_of_the_Royal_Navy_, pp. 96, 97.]
The war having really come, it was inevitable that the Government,
and Elizabeth as its head, should be blamed sooner or later for not
having made adequate provision for it.
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