Before the reasons for this conclusion are given it will be
convenient to deal with the suggestions, or allegations, that
Nelson exposed his fleet at Trafalgar to unduly heavy loss, putting
it in the power of the enemy--to use the words of the _Conqueror's_
officer--to 'have annihilated the ships one after another in
detail'; and that 'the brunt of the action would have been more
equally felt' had a different mode of advance from that actually
chosen been adopted. Now, Trafalgar was a battle in which an
inferior fleet of twenty-six ships gained a victory over a superior
fleet of thirty-three. The victory was so decisive that more than
half of the enemy's capital ships were captured or destroyed
on the spot, and the remainder were so battered that some fell
an easy prey to the victor's side soon after the battle, the
rest having limped painfully to the shelter of a fortified port
near at hand. To gain such a victory over a superior force of
seamen justly celebrated for their spirit and gallantry, very
hard fighting was necessary. The only actions of the Napoleonic
period that can be compared with it are those of Camperdown, the
Nile, and Copenhagen. The proportionate loss at Trafalgar was the
least in all the four battles.[84] The allegation that, had Nelson
followed a different method at Trafalgar, the 'brunt of the action
would have been more equally felt' can be disposed of easily.
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