]
It is now necessary to investigate the statement that Nelson,
hastily and without warning, changed his plan for fighting the
battle. This investigation is much more difficult than that into
the losses of the British fleet, because, whilst the latter can
be settled by arithmetic, the former must proceed largely upon
conjecture. How desirable it is to make the investigation of
the statement mentioned will be manifest when we reflect on the
curious fact that the very completeness of Nelson's success at
Trafalgar checked, or, indeed, virtually destroyed, the study
of tactics in the British Navy for more than three-quarters of
a century. His action was so misunderstood, or, at any rate,
so variously represented, that it generally passed for gospel
in our service that Nelson's method consisted merely in rushing
at his enemy as soon as he saw him. Against this conception his
biographers, one after another, have protested in vain.
At the outset of this investigation it will be well to call to
mind two or three things, simple enough, but not always remembered.
One of these is that advancing to the attack and the attack itself
are not the same operations. Another is, that, in the order of
sailing in two or more columns, if the ships were 'by the wind'
or close-hauled--the column-leaders were not abeam of each other,
but bore from one another in the direction of the wind. Also, it
may be mentioned that by simple alterations of course a line-abreast
may be converted into a line-of-bearing and a line-of-bearing
into a line-ahead, and that the reverse can be effected by the
same operation.
Pages:
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230