This teaches us the necessity to the British Empire of controlling
our maritime communications, and equally teaches those who may
one day be our enemies the advisability of preventing us from
doing so. The lesson in either case is driven farther home by
other considerations connected with communications. In war a
belligerent has two tasks before him. He has to defend himself
and hurt his enemy. The more he hurts his enemy, the less is
he likely to be hurt himself. This defines the great principle
of offensive defence. To act in accordance with this principle,
a belligerent should try, as the saying goes, to carry the war
into the enemy's country. He should try to make his opponents
fight where he wants them to fight, which will probably be as
far as possible from his own territory and as near as possible
to theirs. Unless he can do this, invasion and even serious raids
by him will be out of the question. More than that, his inability
to do it will virtually indicate that on its part the other side
can fix the scene of active hostilities unpleasantly close to
the points from which he desires to keep its forces away.
A line of ocean communications may be vulnerable throughout its
length; but it does not follow that an assailant can operate
against it with equal facility at every point, nor does it follow
that it is at every point equally worth assailing. Lines running
past hostile naval ports are especially open to assault in the
part near the ports; and lines formed by the confluence of two or
more other lines--like, for example, those which enter the English
Channel--will generally include a greater abundance of valuable
traffic than others.
Pages:
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250