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Bridge, Cyprian, Admiral Sir, 1839-1924

"Sea-Power and Other Studies"

Consequently there are some parts at which
an enemy may be expected to be more active than elsewhere, and
it is from those very parts that it is most desirable to exclude
him. They are, as a rule, relatively near to the territory of the
state whose navy has to keep the lines open, that is to say,
prevent their being persistently beset by an enemy. The necessary
convergence of lines towards that state's ports shows that some
portion of them would have to be traversed, or their traversing
be attempted, by expeditions meant to carry out either invasion
or raids. If, therefore, the enemy can be excluded as above
mentioned, invasions, raids, and the more serious molestation of
sea-borne commerce by him will be prevented.
If we consider particular cases we shall find proof upon proof
of the validity of the rule. Three great lines--one from the
neighbourhood of the Cape of Good Hope, one from the Red Sea, and
a third from India and Ceylon--converge near the south-western
part of Australia and run as one line towards the territory of the
important states farther east. If an assailant can be excluded
from the latter or combined line he must either divide his force
or operate on only one of the confluents, leaving the rest free.
The farther he can be pushed back from the point of confluence
the more effectually will he be limited to a single line, because
the combining lines, traced backwards, trend more and more apart,
and it is, therefore, more and more difficult for him to keep
detachments of his force within supporting distance of each other
if they continue to act against two or more lines.


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