Everything
points to the superiority of the plan of beating up the enemy's
quarters and attacking him before he can get far from them on his
way towards his objective. Consequently the only justification
of expending money on the localised vessels of which we have
been speaking, is the probability that an enemy would have some
of his bases within reach of those vessels' efforts. Where this
condition does not exist, the money expended is, from the belligerent
point of view, thrown away. Here comes in the greatest foe of
belligerent efficiency, viz. political expediency. In time of
peace it is thought better to conciliate voters than to prepare
to meet an enemy. If local defence is thought to be pleasing to
an inexpert electorate, it is only too likely to be provided,
no matter how ineffectual and how costly in reality it will turn
out to be.
Not only is the British Empire the first of naval powers, it
is also the first of colonial powers. One attribute is closely
connected with the other; neither, without the other, would be
applicable. The magnitude of our colonial domain, and especially
the imposing aspects of some of its greater components--the Dominion,
the Commonwealth, South Africa, New Zealand--are apt to blind
us to a feature of great strategical importance, and that is
the abundance and excellence of the naval bases that stud our
ocean lines of communication. In thinking of the great daughter
states we are liable to forget these; yet our possession of them
helps greatly to strengthen our naval position, because it
facilitates our assuming a far-reaching offensive.
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