Outlying naval bases, though but moderately fortified, that contain
depots of stores, docks, and other conveniences, have the vice
of all immobile establishments. When war does come, some of them
almost certainly, and all of them possibly, may not be in the
right place with regard to the critical area of operations. They
cannot, however, be moved. It will be necessary to do what has
been done over and over again in war, in the latest as well as
in earlier wars, and that is, establish temporary bases in more
convenient situations. Thus much, perhaps all, of the cost and
trouble of establishing and maintaining the permanent bases will
have been wasted. This inculcates the necessity of having not
as many bases as can be found, but as few as it is possible to
get on with.
The control of ocean communications, or the command of the sea,
being the end of naval warfare, and its acquisition being practicable
only by the assumption of a vigorous offensive, it follows as a
matter of course that we must have a strong and in all respects
efficient mobile navy. This is the fundamental condition on which
the continued existence of the British Empire depends. It is
thoroughly well known to every foreign Government, friendly or
unfriendly. The true objective in naval warfare is the enemy's
navy. That must be destroyed or decisively defeated, or intimidated
into remaining in its ports. Not one of these can be effected
without a mobile, that is a sea-going, fleet.
Pages:
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265