It is highly
significant that he considered so large a number of troops necessary.
It could not have been governed by any estimate of the naval
obstruction to be encountered during the sea passage of the
expedition, but only by the amount of the land force likely to
be met if the disembarkation on our shores could be effected.
The numerical strength in troops which Napoleon thought necessary
compelled him to make preparations on so great a scale that
concealment became quite impossible. Consequently an important
part of his plan was disclosed to us betimes, and the threatened
locality indicated to us within comparatively narrow limits of
precision.
Notwithstanding his failure to appreciate all the difficulties of
naval warfare, the Great Emperor had grasped one of its leading
principles. Before the Peace of Amiens, indeed before his campaign
in Egypt, and even his imposing triumphs in Italy, he had seen
that the invasion of the United Kingdom was impracticable without
first obtaining the command of the sea. His strategic plan,
therefore, included arrangements to secure this. The details of
the plan were changed from time to time as conditions altered;
but the main object was adhered to until the final abandonment
of the whole scheme under pressure of circumstances as embodied
in Nelson and his victorious brothers-in-arms. The gunboats,
transport boats, and other small craft, which to the number of
many hundreds filled the ports of north-eastern France and the
Netherlands, were not the only naval components of the expedition.
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