The strategic problem before our
navy was, however, not quite so easy as this might make it seem.
The enemy's concentration might be attempted either towards Brest
or towards Toulon. In the latter case, a superior force might
fall upon our Mediterranean fleet before our watching ships in
the Atlantic could discover the escape of the enemy's ships from
the Atlantic port or could follow and come up with them. Against
the probability of this was to be set the reluctance of Napoleon
to carry out an eccentric operation which a concentration off
Toulon would necessitate, when the essence of his scheme was
to concentrate in a position from which he could obtain naval
control of the English Channel.
After the addition of the Spanish Navy to his own, Napoleon to
some extent modified his strategic arrangements. The essential
feature of the scheme remained unaltered. It was to effect the
junction of the different parts of his naval force and thereupon
to dominate the situation, by evading the several British fleets
or detachments which were watching his. Before Spain joined him
in the war his intention was that his escaping fleets should
go out into the Atlantic, behind the backs, as it were, of the
British ships, and then make for the English Channel. When he
had the aid of Spain the point of junction was to be in the West
Indies.
The remarkable thing about this was the evident belief that the
command of the sea might be won without fighting for it; won,
too, from the British Navy which was ready, and indeed wished,
to fight.
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