In
January 1805, besides other ships of the class in distant waters
or specially employed, we--on our side--had eighty ships of the
line in commission. A knowledge of this will enable us to form
some idea of the chances of success that would have attended
Napoleon's concentration if it had been effected. To protect the
passage of his invading expedition across the English Channel
he did not depend only on concentrating his more distant fleets.
In the Texel there were, besides smaller vessels, nine sail of
the line. Thus the Emperor did what we may be sure any future
intending invader will not fail to do, viz. he provided his
expedition with a respectable naval escort. The British naval
officers of the day, who knew what war was, made arrangements to
deal with this escort. Lord Keith, who commanded in the Downs,
had under him six sail of the line in addition to many frigates
and sloops; and there were five more line-of-battle ships ready
at Spithead if required.
There had been a demand in the country that the defence of our
shores against an invading expedition should be entrusted to
gunboats, and what may be called coastal small craft and boats.
This was resisted by the naval officers. Nelson had already said,
'Our first defence is close to the enemy's ports,' thus agreeing
with a long line of eminent British seamen in their view of our
strategy. Lord St. Vincent said that 'Our great reliance is on the
vigilance and activity of our cruisers at sea, any reduction in
the number of which by applying them to guard our ports, inlets,
and beaches would, in my judgment, tend to our destruction.
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