As has been stated already, the defence of our sea-borne trade,
being in practice the keeping open of our ocean lines of
communication, carried with it the protection, in part at any
rate, of our transmarine territories. Napoleon held pertinaciously
to the belief that British prosperity was chiefly due to our
position in India. We owe it to Captain Mahan that we now know
that the eminent American Fulton--a name of interest to the members
of this Institution--told Pitt of the belief held abroad that
'the fountains of British wealth are in India and China.' In the
great scheme of naval concentration which the Emperor devised,
seizure of British Colonies in the West Indies had a definite
place. We kept in that quarter, and varied as necessary, a force
capable of dealing with a naval raid as well as guarding the
neighbouring lines of communication. In 1803 we had four ships
of the line in the West Indian area. In 1804 we had six of the
same class; and in 1805, while the line-of-battle ships were
reduced to four, the number of frigates was increased from nine
to twenty-five. Whether our Government divined Napoleon's designs
on India or not, it took measures to protect our interests there.
In January 1804 we had on the Cape of Good Hope and the East Indies
stations, both together, six sail of the line, three smaller
two-deckers, six frigates, and six sloops, or twenty-one ships of
war in all.
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