It may be assumed that altogether these will amount to six or
seven a month. In time of war the period under way would probably
be much longer, and the time spent in expectation of getting
under way in a hurry would almost certainly be considerable,
so that expenditure of coal and machinery lubricants would be
greatly increased.
The point to be made here is that--independently of strategic
conditions, which will be considered later--the difference in the
supply of a given naval force in war and in peace is principally
that in the former the requirements of nearly everything except
provisions will be greater; and consequently that the articles must
be forwarded in larger quantities or at shorter intervals than in
peace time. If, therefore, we have arranged a satisfactory system
of peace supply, that system--defence of the line of communications
being left out of consideration for the present--will merely
have to be expanded in time of war. In other words, practice in
the use of the system during peace will go a long way towards
preparing us for the duty of working it under war conditions.
That a regular system will be absolutely indispensable during
hostilities will not be doubted.
The general principles which I propose to indicate are applicable
to any station. We may allow for a squadron composed of--
4 battleships,
4 large cruisers,
4 second-class cruisers,
13 smaller vessels of various kinds, and
3 destroyers,
being away from the principal base-port of the station for several
months of the year.
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