You
can change its position in accordance with circumstances. If you
cease to use the position first chosen you need trouble yourself
no more about its special communications. You leave nothing at it
which will make it worth the enemy's while to try a dash at it.
The power of changing the flying base from one place to another
gives almost perfect freedom of movement to the fighting ships.
Moreover, the defence of the line communicating with the position
selected is not more difficult than that of the line to a fixed
base.
The defence of a line of communication ought to be arranged on
the same plan as that adopted for the defence of a trade route,
viz. making unceasing efforts to attack the intending assailant.
Within the last few years a good deal has been written about
the employment of cruisers. The favourite idea seems to be that
peace-time preparation for the cruiser operations of war ought to
take the form of scouting and attendance on fleets. The history
of naval warfare does not corroborate this view. We need not forget
Nelson's complaint of paucity of frigates: but had the number
attached to his fleet been doubled, the general disposition of
vessels of the class then in commission would have been virtually
unaltered. At the beginning of 1805, the year of Trafalgar, we
had--besides other classes--232 frigates and sloops in commission;
at the beginning of 1806 we had 264.
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