It is doubtful if forty of
these were attached to fleets.
It is sometimes contended that supply-carriers ought to be vessels
of great speed, apparently in order that they may always keep
up with the fighting ships when at sea. This, perhaps, is due
to a mistaken application of the conditions of a land force on
the march to those of a fleet or squadron making a voyage. In
practice a land army cannot separate itself--except for a very
short time--from its supplies. Its movements depend on those of
its supply-train. The corresponding 'supply-train' of a fleet
or squadron is in the holds and bunkers of its ships. As long as
these are fairly well furnished, the ships might be hampered,
and could not be assisted, by the presence of the carriers. All
that is necessary is that these carriers should be at the right
place at the right time, which is merely another way of saying
that proper provision should be made for 'the stream of supplies
and reinforcements which in terms of modern war is called
communications'--the phrase being Mahan's.
The efficiency of any arrangement used in war will depend largely
on the experience of its working gained in time of peace. Why do
we not work the direct system of supply whilst we are at peace
so as to familiarise ourselves with the operations it entails
before the stress of serious emergency is upon us? There are
two reasons. One is, because we have used the permanent base
method so long that, as usually happens in such cases, we find
it difficult to form a conception of any other.
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